This work studies formal utility and privacy guarantees for a simple multiplicative database transformation, where the data are compressed by a random linear or affine transformation, reducing the number of data records substantially, while preserving the number of original input variables. We provide an analysis framework inspired by a recent concept known as differential privacy. Our goal is to show that, despite the general difficulty of achieving the differential privacy guarantee, it is possible to publish synthetic data that are useful for a number of common statistical learning applications. This includes high dimensional sparse regression [24] , principal component analysis (peA), and other statistical measures [16] based on the covariance of the initial data.
I. INTRODUCTION
In statistical learning, privacy is increasingly a concern whenever large amounts of confidential data are manipulated within or published outside an organization. It is often important to allow researchers to analyze data utility without leaking information or compromising the privacy of individual records. In this work, we demonstrate that one can preserve utility for a variety of statistical applications while achieving a formal definition of privacy. The algorithm we study is a simple random projection by a matrix of independent Gaussian random variables that compresses the number of records in the database. Our goal is to preserve the privacy of every individual in the database, even if the number of records in the database is very large. In particular, we show how this randomized procedure can achieve a form of "differential privacy" [9, 8] , while at the same time showing that the compressed data can be used for Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and other operations that rely on the accuracy of the empirical covariance matrix computed via the compressed data, compared to its population or the uncompressed correspondents. Toward this goal, we study "distributional privacy", which is more natural for many statistical inference tasks.
More specifically, the data are represented as an n x p matrix X. Each of the p columns is an attribute, and each of the n rows is the vector of attributes for an individual record. The data are compressed by a random linear transformation X~X -<DX, where <D is a random m x n matrix with m « n. It is also natural to consider a random affine transformation X~X == <DX + 11, where 11 is a random m x p matrix, as considered in [24] for privacy analysis, the latter of which is beyond the scope of this paper and intended as future work. Such transformations have been called "matrix masking" in the privacy literature [7] . The entries of <D are taken to be independent Gaussian random variables, but other distributions are possible. The resulting compressed data can then be made available for statistical analysis; that is, we think of X as "public," while <D and 11 are private and only needed at the time of compression. However, even if <D were revealed, recovering X from X requires solving a highly underdetermined linear system and comes with information theoretic privacy guarantees, as demonstrated in [24] .
Informally, differential privacy [9, 8] limits the increase in the information that can be learned when any single entry is changed in the database. This limit implies [17] that allowing one's data to be included in the database is in some sense incentive-compatible. Differential privacy imposes a compelling and clear requirement, that when running a privacy-preserving algorithm on two neighboring databases that differ in only one entry, the probability of any possible outcome of the algorithm should be nearly (multiplicatively) equal. Many existing results in differential privacy use additive output perturbations by adding a small amount of random noise to the released information according to the sensitivity of the query function f on data X. In this work, we focus on a class F of Lipschitz functions that are bounded, up to a constant L, by the differences between two covariance matrices, (for example, for L == x:x and its compressed realization L' == x T cD:cDX given <D), (1) where A, D are positive definite matrices and 1/.1/ is understood to be any matrix norm (for example, PCA depends on 1/ L -L '1/F). Hence we focus on releasing a multiplicative form of perturbation of the input data, such that for a particular type of functions as in (1), we achieve both utility and privacy. Due to the space limits, we only explore PCA in this paper.
We emphasize that although one could potentially release a version of the covariance matrix to preserve data privacy while performing PCA and functions as in (1), releasing the compressed data <DX is more informative than releasing the perturbed covariance matrix (or other summaries) alone. For example, Zhou et al. [24] demonstrated the utility of this random linear transformation by analyzing the asymptotic properties of a statistical estimator under random projection in the high dimensional setting for n « p. They showed that the relevant linear predictors can be learned from the compressed data almost as well as they could be from the original uncompressed data. Moreover, the actual predictions based on new examples are almost as accurate as they would be had the original data been made available. Finally, it is possible to release the compressed data plus some other features of the data to yield more information, although this is beyond the scope of the current paper. We note that in order to guarantee differential privacy, p < n is required.
In the context of guarding privacy over a set of databases Sn == {XI,X2, ... },where Lj ==XJXj/n,VXj.weintroduce an additional parameter in our privacy definition,~max(Sn), which is an upper bound on pairwise distances between any two databases Xl, X2 E Sn (differing in any number of rows), according to a certain distance measure. In some sense, this parametrized approach of tuning the magnitude of the distance measure~max(Sn) is the key idea we elaborate in Section III.
Toward these goals, we develop key ideas in Section IV, that include measure space truncation and renormalization for each measure Px]. V) with Law £ (·IXj)~N(O, Lj); these ideas are essential in order to guarantee differential privacy, which requires that even for very rare events, lIn Px, (£) / Pzj (£) I remains small Vi,). We show that such rare events, when they happen not to be useful for the utilities that we explore, can be cut out entirely from the output space by simply discarding such outputs and regenerating a new X. In this way, we provide a differential privacy guarantee by avoiding the comparisons made on these rare events. We conjecture that this is a common phenomenon rather than being specific to our analysis alone. In some sense, this observation is the inspiration for our distributional privacy definition: over a large number n of elements drawn from V, the entire ocean of elements, the tail events are even more rare by the Law of Large Numbers, and hence we can safely truncate events whose measure IP [£] decreases as n increases.
Related work is summarized in Section I-A. Section II formalizes privacy definitions. Section III gives more detail of our probability model and summarizes our results on privacy and PCA (with proof in Section V). All proofs appear in the full version of the paper, available at http://arxiv.org/abs/0901.1365.
A. Related Work
Research on privacy in statistical data analysis has a long history, going back at least to [5] . We refer to [7] for discussion and further pointers into this literature; recent work includes [21] . Recent approaches to privacy include data swapping [14] , k-anonymity [22] , and cryptographic approaches (for instance, [19, 13] ). Much of the work on data perturbation for privacy (for example, [12, 15, 23] ) focuses on additive or multiplicative perturbation of individual records, which may not preserve similarities or other relationships within the database. Prior to [24] , in [1] , an information-theoretic quantification of privacy was proposed.
A body of recent work (for example, [6, 11, 3, 9, 8, 10, 18, 2, 17] ) explores the tradeoffs between privacy and utility while developing the definitions and theory of differential privacy. The two main techniques used to achieve differential privacy to date have been additive perturbation of individual database queries by Laplace noise and the "exponential mechanism" [17] . In contrast, we provide a polynomial time noninteractive algorithm for guaranteeing differential privacy. Our goal is to show that, despite the general difficulty of achieving the differential privacy guarantee, it is possible to do so with an efficient algorithm for a specific class of functions.
The work of [16] and [24] , like the work presented here, both consider low rank random linear transformations of the data X, and discuss privacy and utility. Liu et al. [16] argue heuristically that random projection should preserve utility for data mining procedures that exploit correlations or pairwise distances in the data. Their privacy analysis is restricted to observing that recovering X from <DX requires solving an under-determined linear system. Zhou et al. [24] provide information-theoretic privacy guarantees, showing that the information rate I(X;X)~0 as n~00. Their work casts privacy in terms ofthe rate of information communicated about X through X, maximizing over all distributions on X.
Hence their analysis provides privacy guarantees in an average sense, whereas in this work we prove differential privacystyle guarantees that aim to apply to every participant in the database semantically.
II. DEFINITIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
Let a database D contain a set of n records. We focus on a non-interactive database access mechanism A such that A(D) induces a distribution over sanitized output databases V'. We first recall the differential privacy definition from [8] . We now formalize our notation. Notation: Let V be a collection of all records (potentially coming from some underlying distribution) and a (V) represent the entire set of input databases with elements drawn from
where Xi E a(V),Vi, denote a set of databases, each with n elements drawn from V. Although differential privacy is defined with respect to all D, E E a (D), we constrain the definition of distributional privacy to the scope of Sn, which becomes clear in Definition 11.4. We let V' be the entire set of possible output databases. We now define differential privacy for continuous output. We introduce an additional parameter l5 which measures how different two databases are according to V below. Definition 11.3. Let V(D, E) be the distance between D and E according to a certain metric, which is related to the utility we aim to provide. Let d(D, E) denote the number of rows in which D and E differ. S-ccmstmined a- Differential ((a, l5) -Differential Privacy) requires the following condition, sup /1(PD, PE) :::; e'", (2) 
where /1(P, Q) == ess sup DEl)!~~(D) denotes the essential supremum over 1)' for the Radon-Nikodym derivative d P I d Q.
Let Sn == {Xl, X2, ...} be a set of databases of n records.
Let /1 max(Sn) bound the pairwise distance between Xi, X, E Sn, Vi, i. We now introduce a notion of distributional privacy, that is similar in spirit to that in [4] . where I Xj (.) is the density function for the conditional distribution with law c (-IXj ) , Vi given x;
Note that this composes nicely if one is considering databases that differ in multiple rows. In particular, randomness in Xj is not directly exploited in the definition as we treat elements in X, E (J (1)) as fixed data. One could assume that they come from an underlying distribution, e.g., a multivariate Gaussian N(O, L*), and infer the distance between Li and its population correspondent L *. We now show that distributional privacy is a stronger concept than differential privacy.
Theorem 11.5. Given Sn, if A satisfies (a, l5)-distributional privacy as in Definition 11.4 for all X] E Sn, then A satisfies (a, l5)-Differential Privacy as in Definition 11.3 for all Xj E s.
Proof For the same constraint parameter l5, if we guarantee that (3) is satisfied, for all Xi, Xj E Sn that differ only in a single row such that V(Xi, Xj) :::; l5, we have shown the a -differential privacy on Sn; clearly, this type of guarantee is necessary in order to guarantee a -distributional privacy over all Xi, X j E S; that satisfy the l5 constraint. •
III. PROBABILITY MODEL AND SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Let (Xi) represent the matrix corresponding to Xi E Sn.
By default, we use (Xi)j E IRP, Vi == 1, ... , n, and (XT)j E IR n , Vi == 1, ... p to denote row vectors and column vectors of matrix (Xi) respectively. Throughout this paper, we assume that given any Xi E Sn, columns are normalized, "(XJ)j"~=n,Vj = 1, ... ,p,VXi ESn
ISIT 2009, Seoul, Korea, June 28 -July 3, 2009 which can be taken as the first step of our sanitization Suppose we choose a reference point LI which can be thought of as an approximation to the true value L *. Assumption 1: Let Amin(L I I) == Ama}("Lj) 2: Cmin for some constant Cmin > 0. Suppose II r 112 == 0(1) and II /1112 == 0(1). Assumption 1 is crucial in the sense that it guarantees that all matrices in Sn stay away from being singular (see Lemma IIL3). We are now ready to state the first main result.
Theorem 111.2. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Assuming that II Ll1l2 ,Amin(LI) and Amin(Li), VXi E s, are all in the same order, and m 2: n (In2np). Consider the worst case realization when 1I/1I1F == 0(p/1 max(Sn)), where /1 max < 1.
In order to guard (distributional) privacy for all Xi E S; in the sense ofDefinition 11.4, it is sufficient if f.max(Sn) = 0 (1/(p 2J m In2n p)) .
(9)
The following lemma is a standard result on existence conditions for L i 1 given L 11 . It also shows that all eigenvalue conditions in Theorem IIL2 indeed hold given Assumption 1. eigenvectors A (resp. (A + B) ). Then these satisfy IIpD(A) -pD(A + B)IIF :s IIBIIFI£5D. (10) Subject to measure truncation of at most 1I n 2 in each P"Lj , VX E Sn, as we show in Section IV, we have, Theorem 111.5. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. If we allow max(Sn) == O(Jlogpln), then we essentially perform PCA on the compressed sample covariance matrix X T X I m effectively in the sense of Proposition 111.4: that is, in the form
for m == Q(p 2In2np). On the other hand, the databases in Sn are private in the sense of Definition 11.4, so long as p2 == 0 (Jnlm/logn). Hence in the worst case, we require P = 0 (n 1 / 6 IJln2np) .
As a special case, we look at the following example. o(nIlog n) I /4, in order to conduct PCA on compressed data, (subject to measure truncation of at most 1I n 2 in each P"Lj' VX E Sn,) effectively in the sense of Proposition 111.4, while preserve the a-differential privacy for a == 0(1).
IV. DISTRIBUTIONAL PRIVACY WITH BOUNDED~max(Sn)
In this section, we show how we can modify the output events X to effectively hide some large-tail events. We make it clear how these tail events are connected to a particular type of utility. Given Xi, let X == <DXi == (Xl, ... , X m ) T. Let [z, (x j) = exp l~xJ~i 1 x j l II~d 1/2(2n )p/2 be the density for Gaussian distribution N(d, Li) . Before modification, the density function J». (X) is m Iz, (X) == IT Iz, (X}) . }=l We focus on defining two procedures that lead to both distributional and differential types of privacy. Indeed, the proof of Theorem IV.6 applies to both, as the distance metric V(XI, X2) does not specify how many rows Xl and X2 differ in. We use~max as a shorthand for~max(Sn) when it is clear.
ISIT 2009, Seoul, Korea, June 28 - July 3, 2009 Procedure 1~1. (TRUNCATION OF THE TAIL FOR RANDOM VECTORS IN JRP ) We require <D to be an independent random draw each time we generate a X for compression (or when we apply it to the same dataset for handling a truncation event). W.l.o.g, we choose LI to be a reference point. Now we only examine output databases X E JRmxp such that for C == J2(CI + C2), where CI~2.5 and C2~7.7, max !(X T Xlm)jk -~l (j, k)! < CJln2nPlm+~max, (12) J,k where~max(Sn) = 0 (Jlognln). Algorithmically, one can imagine that for an input X, each time we see an output X == <DX that does not satisfy our need in the sense of (12), we throw the output database X away, and generate a new random draw <D' to calculate <D'X and repeat until <D'X indeed satisfies (12) . We also note that the adversary neither sees the databases we throwaway nor finds out that we did so.
Given Xi E Sn, let ItD"Li be the probability measure over random outcomes of <DXi. Upon truncation, Procedure 1~2. (RENORMALIZATION) We set f~i (X) == 0 for all X E JRmxp belonging to set E, where E == {X: IIJr I(X:X)~~1(j,k)1> ->:+~max}, (13) corresponds to the bad events that we truncate from the outcome in Procedure IV.1; We then renormalize the density as in (11) on the remaining X that satisfies (12) to obtain: I' (X) = h.i(X) . . Hence we safely ignore this normalization issue given it only changes a (m, (5) by O(Iln 2).
The following lemma bounds the probability on the events that we truncate in Procedure IV.I. Lemma 1~4. According to any individualprobabilitymeasure ItD"Li which corresponds to the sample space for outcomes of <DXi, suppose that the columns of (Xi) have been normalized to have "(XT)}"~== n,Vi,) == I, ... ,p andm 2:: 2(CI + C2) In2np, then for E as defined in (13) , ItD"Li [E] :s~2.
As hinted after Definition 11.4 regarding distributional privacy, we can think of the input data as coming from a distribution, such that~max(Sn) in (5) can be derived with a typical large deviation bound between the sample and population covariances. For example, for multivariate Gaussian, Iz, (.) , which is simply a sum of terms as bounded as in (15) .
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 111.5
Combining the following theorem, which illustrates the tradeoff between the parameters n, P and m for PCA, with Theorem IIL2, we obtain Theorem IIL5.
Theorem~1. Fora database X E Sn, let A, A+B be the original and compressed sample covariance matrices respectively:
A == x:xand B == X~X -x:x, where X is generated via Procedure IVI. By requiring that m == Q (p 2 In 2np), we can achieve meaningful bounds in the form of (10). •
Proof' We know that

